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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. V. MOSER, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. 
T H E INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH: CARLYLE F. 
GRONNING, JOHN R. SCHONE, 1 
and STEPHEN lVI. HADLEY, its ) 
members; COMMERCIAL CAR-
RIERS, INC., and FIREMAN'S 
FUND, 
- Defendants-Respondents. i 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 
11031 
Appeal from An Order of The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Denying Plaintiff's Petition For Re-hearing 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah denying plaintiff's claim for Work-
men's Compensation. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a truck driver and has been for forty 
( 40) or forty-five ( 45) years (Tr. 6). In 1965, he 
leased a tractor or truck to Western Auto Transport 
Company, and drove the tractor as an employee of 
Western Auto until it was sold to Commercial Car-
riers, Inc., during or about 1960. When the Change of 
Ownership was made, plaintiff and the other driver 
employees retained their seniority status and continued 
working substantially under the same lease arrange-
ments as before. The particular Leased Equipment 
Agreement under which plaintiff was working on Sep-
tember 9, 1965, is attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's 
Petition for Writ of Review on file herein. The Agree-
ment required that Commercial Carriers, Inc., have ex-
clusive control over the tractor and that the tractor be 
"operated only by employees of the Company selected 
by the Company, paid by the Company, and carried on 
the Company's payroll". The Agreement also provided 
"that the Company shall be fully responsible to the 
Shipper and the public for the direction, conduct, con-
dition and operation of the leased equipment while 
operated by the Company under this lease", and that 
"the Company shall have the right to use said leased 
motor vehicle equipment for any lawful purpose in 
connection with its transportation business and shall 
have full possession and control of said motor vehicle 
equipment for the full period of this lease". The Agree-
ment further provided that the Company would provide 
at its sole expense whatever insurance it deemed neces-
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sary and which was required by law and that "the Com-
pany shall also comply with the 'V orkmen' s Compen-
sation Laws with respect to all employees engaged in 
operation under this agreement ... " 
The business of the Company (Commercial Car-
riers, Inc.,) was and is to transport automobiles, which 
it does by using tractors to pull trailers loaded with 
automobiles or to pull trailers unloaded when they are 
"dead headed" or moving empty to a point where they 
can again be loaded for another haul. These trailers 
are owned by Commercial Carriers, Inc. The Company 
operates by virtue of holding certain Common Carrier 
permits. The Appellant is not a licensed common car-
rier ( Tr. 9) . 
Pursuant to said Leased Equipment Agreement and 
others like it which preceded it, Appellant had for many 
years driven the tractor pulling loads of cars both intra-
state and interstate, and being gone from his home and 
the Company's Salt Lake Terminal most of the time, 
day and night,on the Company's business. He drives the 
tractor, pulling the company's trailer both loaded and 
empty whenever and wherever the Company directs. 
Appellant's pay as an employee of the Company is 
determined by the amount of revenue which the Com-
pany receives from its customers. This revenue, of 
course, is limited to the times when the trailer is being 
pulled with a load of cars. There is no revenue for the 
Company or its employees when the trailer is moving 
empty (Tr. 9). 
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As a driver employee of the Company, appellant 
received, as provided by the Agreement, 65% of the 
revenue produced by the tractor and trailer that he 
operated. But out of this 65%, the Company deducted 
all operating and maintenance expense of the tractor 
and trailer, expenses which under the Agreement, it was 
his obligation to bear. From the Company's 35%, the 
Company bore all insurance expense including '"' ork-
men's Compensation, the expense of most of the road 
permits, and the social security tax. The Company also 
withheld and paid to the Internal Revenue Service and 
the State Tax Commission the drivers' Federal and 
State Income Withholding Tax. 
Although the amount of a driver's wages is deter-
mined by the amount of revenue-paying miles he drives, 
he is considered to be on the job the moment he steps 
on the truck or while checking the equipment and start-
ing it (Tr. 8). According to I.C.C. regulations this 
time is included in the driver's logging or on-duty time, 
and is included in figuring the maximum hours he is 
permitted to drive, namely, seventy hours in any eight 
consecutive days and nights (Tr. 7 and 8), and this 
rule a pp lied to the time Moser spent trying to get the 
truck started on the morning of September 9, 1965, 
when he was injured (Tr. 8). Appellant's uncontro-
verted testimony in this respect as elicited from Moser 
by respondents' representative at the hearing as appears 
on pp. 7-8 of the transcript is confirmed by the Safety 
Regulations of the I.C.C., which provide as follows: 
"Section 195.2 DEFINITIONS - As used 
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in this part, the following words and terms are 
construed to mean: 
(a) On-duty time. * * * The term "On-duty 
time" shall include: * * * 
( 4) All time, other than driving time, in or 
~pon ~my motor_ vehicle except time spent resting 
m a sleeper berth as defined in Section 195.2 (g). 
* * * * 
( 7) All time repairing, obtaining assistance, 
or remaining in attendance upon a disabled ve-
hicle; * * * ." 
On September 8, 1965, Appellant returned to Salt 
Lake from Vernal, Utah, where he had delivered a 
trailer load of cars. He arrived at Salt Lake 11 :00 
or 12 :00 o'clock at night, signed in at the yard, went to 
his home in Bountiful, and slept the balance of the 
night, planning to return to the yard the next morning 
(Tr. 7). He left the tractor and trailer at a lot near 
his home in Bountiful while he slept (Tr. 6). Knowing 
that he was to work the next morning (Tr. 7), he left 
his home with his suitcase on his way to work, went 
to the lot where the truck and trailer unit was parked, 
and tried to start the truck, but it wouldn't start (Tr. 
3). After working on it awhile, he went back to his home 
and called his employer on the 'phone. He talked with 
Norman C. Gordon, the Company's terminal manager 
in Salt Lake City (Tr. 10), and told him he couldn't 
get the truck started (Tr. 9) . As related by Moser, 
Norman told him "to check it out for ignition and gas 
and see what was wrong if I could, and if I couldn't do 
it why he'd send help out to me" (Tr. 3). 
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Inasmuch as the battery was low. he took his wife 
in his car to the truck so that she could help him get 
started \Tr. 31. 'Yhat happend then, as stated by 
)loser. follows: ··1 jumped cables that goes to the 
truck and she turned it over and I checked the ignition. 
I had spark. and I checked for gas and I w-asn·t getting 
any gas. so I drained out a little out of the truck and 
pourt:>d it in the carburetor. and she starie<l it. but it 
stopped. I thought. well. Ill pour a little more in and 
if it starts then Ill keep dribbling a little iIL lYbch. 
you shouldn't dt.1. I guess. 
··_\nyhow. it back.tired th3t time. :ind I ~as s:and-
ing up on the bumper leaning Qver. and I .~wnped bsc~ 
and when I did. I had this can oi g:b :::..!:d ilirew ~: 
all '-wer m,- ri~-rht side. and :: inm~:eiv c;: . .-.. ~.zr:.: ::ne . ~ . -
l)Il ~. 'Yell. my w:ie. ~d my s::.5tc:-r-IL-~" ~pp-.:r..eii 
to be tlk-ttkll...1. Ii they b.'1dn.t bttr:. I --:·:.hd ;...~.-::- ~-~::-: 
up. Bn-ause llt.'lx'-l~- else '"-~5 L'~:-sc- e.::.:·...:.~ :.- i~ :!.:C:.,Y· 
thin~. T!k-Y tiniliY ~1: De ri.n:- ·::..:.:. F'~~i :::y- ~ •::-::--~ ;·, ..... . . ..... 
'-'tf. and ~1t the ~ ~'"J.:. ~2 ::-.c-~ I _E:"·...:.: -·-r:: ~--:-
the tru~k afta ±~n- I~. i . 
_.\.RGl~IE:\T 
Fl'l:\T I 
l ~ DE~ Y l ~ '-~ _\ r FELL_-\.-:\ T ~ L' Lil~ I F 1.) R 
'y '_) R K) l F" . ~ \... \_ y~ l r E-:\ ~ .. -\. r 1 ... -.-:\ -=-~ ~ ~ .y~. ~. 
) ll ~ ~ l l' ~ l~ .. \ ~ F 11 l r ~ :' F 1...- = ~ = ._- "> ~ "> "? = ~ =:' -
l ~ "-~ ~ 1..' F t. _ h ~- \ \ - : : ~ \.- : : '-_ ::\ ::·_ ~ = =:- ~~-::- ?.. ~- _-.: 
Sl~PPOR TED BY THE REC 0 RD AXD 
THEHEFORE A.RBITRARY AXD CAPRICI-
UCS UR ARE :'\OT LEGALLY SIGXIFICAXT 
CXDEH THE CIRCC)IS'L\XCES OF THIS 
CASE. 
There are two statements in the Commission's 
Onler which are directly contrary to the only fi-idence 
it1 t.he record. The first is the finding that ...... \.pplic:ant 
\ms a iicensed common carrier.' The second is the find-
ing that ··at the time or the explosion applicant was 
uot on his way to the terminal". The facts are that ap-
plicant was not a licenseci common carrier. His employer 
\\ <h ..... ~nd applicant was on his way to the terminal at 
the time of the "explosion ... 'Ye shall now renew the 
record on these matters. 
The fact that Commercial Carriers, Inc., was the 
Lcen-,ed Common Carrier and not )fr. )loser is stated 
•:.11 page 9 of the Transcript as follows: 
"The Referee: .... -Ue you a certitied carrer in 
interstate commerce r 
.... \.nswer: _\ C OilllllOil Carrier? 
The Referee: Yes. 
The 'Yitness: Tht:JI are, Yes. 
The Referee: .... \. C •)IlllllOil Carrier? 
The \Yitness: Yes. The_u Art' all o•er the 
Cnited States ... , Our emphasis·. 
The fore~·l'•ing is fr;:- C'IUY ET:dence as to "ho had 
_ Lc:ense. The ~ms,.-er is .;imply th~1t Colll.illerci:il Car-
: ~r-. Inc.. bad a Cl'lllli.Ln c~uric-r license. rwt )fr. 
~fr:.ser. 
As to the other erroneous finding of fact which 
the Commission makes, the only evidence as to where 
.Mr. Moser was going when he was injured is as follows: 
On page 2 of the transcript after referring to the 
morning of September 9, Mr. ~loser states: "I left 
my home with my suitcase, and I went down to where 
my truck was parked, ready to go to work." 'Vhen he 
coudn't get the truck started, he called his employer, 
who then gave him instructions as to what to do to 
get it started. 
On page 6 of the Transcript, during Mr. Robert-
son's cross examination of l\ilr. Moser, we read: 
Question: Do you report to work ever morn-
ing? 
Answer: Yes, whenever I'm in. You know, if 
I'm home. When I finish a trip, I report in the 
next morning. That is what I was doing. 
Question: When had you made your last trip? 
Answer: I got in-well, I signed in down to 
the yard. I think it was right around midnight. 
I had come in from Vernal. I made a trip to 
Vernal, and it was 11 :00 or 12 :00 o'clock at night 
and I went home, slept all night, and was going 
down the next rnorning ." (Our emphasis) . 
Again on pp. 7-8, we read (Moser still being cross-
examined by Robertson: 
Question: On the morning of the accident, had 
you called to see if you were to work that day? 
Answer: vV ell, I knew I was to work. 
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Question: \Vhen did you find that out? 
Answer: I cpuld tell when I signed in how 
many was ahead of me and I knew I'd get out. 
Question: \Vhat would be the usual course in 
your reporting? 
Answer: Well, at that time, we had a 9:00 dis-
patcher, who was supposed to be down there at 
9 :00, and he set up whatever loads he had drivers 
in for. And the first one in on the list would take 
his load, see. So that is why I was going down 
there at 9 :00 and that is why at five minutes to 
9 :00 ... when I couldn't get my truck started 
... I called him and told him I couldn't start it. 
Because I couldn't get there at 9:00 o'clock, see 
The foregoing evidence establishes conclusively 
that when Appellant left his home that morning he 
was, in fact, on his way to the Terminal and the only 
thing that prevented his accomplishing that objective 
was the accident he suffered while trying to get the 
motor started. Instead of going to the Terminal as he 
intended he went to the hospital (Tr. 4) because of 
the accident. 
All of the findings of fact upon which the Com-
mission bases its conclusions of law with respect to 
Appellant's not being an empJoyee when the accident 
occurred-at least as such facts appear in the Order-
areas follows: 
I. "At the time of the explosion Applicant was 
not on his way to the terminal." 
2. "Applicant was a licensed common carrier." 
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3. "He was not paid time or mileage for the 
thirteen miles from his home to the terminal." 
4. "Applicant did receive wages but the wages 
were paid because the I.C.C. required it. How-
ever, the wages were deducted from the 65% of 
the freight charges." 
We have shown from the record that the first two 
findings of fact are in error, completely without founda-
tion of any evidence, and contrary to the evidence. If 
these findings were intended to support the conclusions 
of law then the Order necessarily is arbitrary and capri-
cious, being without factual foundation, and is in error 
for these reasons alone. 
As to the last two findings about wages we observe 
that in determining whether Appellant wa~ injured "in 
the course of his employment" the absence of wages 
at the time of injury is not an important factor by the 
weight of authority. In Horovitz, Current Trends In 
Workmen's Compensation, we read at pages 770-771: 
"The overwhelmil}g weight of authority re-
gards the absence of wages as irrelevant on the 
issue of arising in the course of the employment. 
While payment of wages for the period in ques-
tion strengthens the fact that the injury occurred 
in the course of the employment, as paid time 
· is rarely other than 'in the course of' the employ-
ment, the absence of payment is usually of little; 
if any, importance. In short, 'in the course of 




THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DENYING 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM ON THE GROUND 
TIIAT APPELLANT WAS NOT AN EM-
PLOYEE WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE AC-
CIDENT IS BASED UPON LEGAL CONCLU-
SIONS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The Commisson in its Order observes that the 
"applicant did sustain an injury by accident. The only 
issue is whether it was in the course of his employment 
at the time of the accident." In solving this issue the 
Commission makes the findings of fact referred to 
above in Point I and then gives what may be identified 
as its conclusions of law as follows: 
I. "His work began when he reached the ter-
minal and not when he left home." 
2. "Applicant was not an employee of the 
Commercial Carriers, Inc., within the meaning 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, when the 
accident occurred." 
Based on these legal conclusions, the Commission en-
tered its Order denying the claim. 
It would thus appear from the Commission's view 
of the issue involved and from its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that the Commission has considered 
this case as one in which the claimant fails as an em-
ployee in the course of his employment because he, at 
the time of the accident, had not yet reported for work. 
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It is our position that Appellant was an employee 
of Commercial Carriers, Inc., and in the course of hi-, 
employment at the time of the accident for the followina 
• 0 
reasons: 
1. He had left his home and was on his way to the 
Terminal to do his employer's work. 
2. He was trying to start the truck when the acci-
dent occurred. 
3. He was following his employer's specific in-
structions as to how to try to get the engme started 
when the accident occurred. 
4. He was working on the engine of the true~ 
which, under a lease agreement. belonged to and wa~ 
under the exclusi...-e control of his employer. Also. the 
Company·s trailer was attached to the truck. 
5. The truck and trailer not onh- were in the con-
trol. use, possession or ownership of the employer. but 
they were in constant use by the appellant exclusin·l~­
operated by appellant for his employer. and essential 
in all the work appellant 'ms doing for the emplo>·er. 
6. r nder the ~-\..greement the truck was to be op-
erated only by an employee of the Company selected 
by the Company: and ~-\.. ppellant was the employee 
selected by the Company to operate it: and at the time 
of the accident he w~1s in the process of trying to operate 
it in furtherance of the Company·s business. 
"-e belieH' thi~ case has an element creating an 
.. in the CL•nrse llf hi.; emplt•~·ment'· situatiL•ll independent 
12 
of elements which would place it in the category of 
an exception to the "going and coming" to work rule. 
That element is the fact that when Appellant was in-
jured he was following specific instructions of his em-
ployer as to what to do to try to get the engine started. 
If this element were not sufficient by itself to place 
Appellant "in the course of his employment," it cer-
tainly adds to all the factors which bring this case 
within the exceptions to the "going and coming" rule. 
A brief statement of the rule and the need for a 
developing of exceptions thereto is well stated in 
OBrien ·cs. First Camden National Bank and Trust 
Company, 37 N.J. 158, 179 A2d 740 (1940): 
"In the administration of workmen's com-
pensation laws, a doctrine grew up known as the 
'going and coming' rule. In the jurisdictions 
where adopted, it signified that until an employee 
came on the employer's premises he was not in 
the course of employment; also that at the end 
of the work period on leaving the premises he 
stepped out of the course of employment. In 
short, injuries recefred en route to and from 
work were said to be non-compensable ... The 
sweeping generality of the rule inevitably 
spa,vned exceptions ... The various exceptions 
adopted have in turn brought back into sha.rper 
focus the basic statutory test of compensab1hty, 
that is, whether under the facts and circum-
stances of the particular situation the injury 
arose out of and in the course of the employment. 
Too easv reference to the subordinate going and 
coming ·precept manifestly pointed in the direc-
tion of injustice in particubr fact complexes. 
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Application of this basic test to the facts in a 
given case must be engaged in with an appre-
ciation of the beneficient social purpose of work-
men's compensation. 'Vhen so applied, if it can 
be said reasonably that the employee is servina 
an incidental interest of his employer at the tim~ 
of injury, the right to compensation exists." 
Recently, this court had occasion to express its 
approval of a view in harmony with the foregoing in 
the case of Bailey vs. Utah State Industrial Cornmis-
sion, 16 Utah 2d 208, 398 P.2d 545. This case was an 
appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission 
denying applicant an award for the death of Bailey. 
Prior to his death the deceased owned and operated a 
service station in Lehi and was injured as a sole pro-
prietor. He was thus employer and employee. The ap-
plicant usually left his home from 5 :00 A.M. to 5 :30 
A.1\11. and drove, in his station wagon, to the service 
station which he customarily opened at 6 :00 A.M. On 
September 23, 1963, at approximately 5 :45 A . .M., 
Bailey was killed in a one-car (his station wagon) 
accident at a point less than a mile from his business 
and on the highway leading thereto. 
The commission, in denying the claim, determined 
that the accident did not occur in the course of employ-
ment, because the deceased was not on a special mission 
but was merely on his way to his place of employment. 
In reversing the Commission, the Court said: 
"There are cases and authority to the effect 
that, when an employee is required by his em-
14 
plo:f er to bring his own vehicle to the place of 
busmess for use there, the employee is covered 
while going to and from work in the vehicle. 
"It is undisputed that the station wagon in-
volved was used by the deceased in his business 
and somewhat necessary thereto. He used it for 
emergency calls at all hours, carried in it some 
necessary tools and implements to service or 
repair customers' automobiles and permitted 
customers to use it while their cars were being 
serviced at hi.s station. * * * 
"Under the uncontradicted evidence, it ap-
pears that the station wagon * * * was an in-
strumentality of decedent's business and was 
subject to that use. It was the deceased's regular 
and definite duty to take the vehicle in the morn-
ings to the station for its use in the business. In 
doing so, he was performing for his employer 
(himself) a substantial service required by his 
employment (business) at the place and in the 
manner so required. Under these circumstances, 
we hold that the deceased sustained his fatal in-
juries in an accident that occurred in the course 
of his employment." 
Surely, if Bailey's death was compensable because 
he was driving to work in his own car which was used 
in his business for emergency calls at all hours, Appel-
lant's injuries should be compensable inasmuch as he 
was trying to start his employer's truck and trailer unit 
so he could go to work and use it constantly in the 
employers' business. 
A case very much in point is Barak vs. H. E. 
T-V csterman Lumber Company, 239 Minn. 327, 58 N.W. 
2d 567 ( 1953) . In this case, a lumberyard manager died 
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from carbon monoxide poisoning while attempting to 
start his own automobile at his home preparatory to 
going to work. He was expected to have his car at his 
place of employment to make deliveries and inspec-
tions. The employer paid his mileage when he was on 
company business, but did not pay mileage for the trip 
to and from work. The death was held to be compen-
sable. The Court said: 
"In our opinion, the testimony was sufficiently 
positive and unimpeached to justify a finding 
that decedent had to have his car in connection 
with his business. If so, it follows that he had 
to get it started. There appears to be sufficient 
evidence here to indicate that he was working 
on the car, or was attempting to get it started 
when the fatal accident occurred. * * * 
"In view of our holding that the record con-
vinces us that as a matter of law decedent used 
or was expected to use his car almost daily in 
connection with his employment, we must con-
clude under the facts and circumstances here 
that as a practical matter, part of his services 
in connection with his employment, was to take 
his car with him to the lumber yard in order to 
have it ready when needed, rather than then hav-
ing to go back home and get it each time. It is 
our opinion that such service required his pres-
e.nce in his garage to start his car at the time of 
the injury and that his accidental death arose 
out of and in the course of his employment." 
This case is cited with approval in Larson's T¥ ork-
men' s Compensation Law. In paragraph 17.50 of this 
authority we read: 
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"Closely. anal~go.us to the employer's convey-
ance rule m prmc1ple is the holding that the 
~ourse of e~ployment embraces the trip to and 
from. work if t.he employee as part of his job is 
reqmred to brmg with him his own car, truck, 
or motorcycle. The same theory applies; the 
obligations of the job reach out beyond the prem-
ises, make the vehicle a mandatory part of the 
employment environment, and compel the em-
ployee to submit to the hazards associated with 
private motor travel, which otherwise he would 
have the option of avoiding. Since this is the 
theory, it is immaterial whether the employee is 
compensated for the expenses of the trip." 
In Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Com-
pensation, pages 667-682, we read: 
"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the 
course of his employment until he crosses the 
employment threshold is itself subject to many 
exceptions. Off-premise injuries to or from work, 
in both liberal and narrow states, are compen-
sable * * * ( 6) where the employee is required 
to bring his automobile to his place of business 
for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are 
equally justified, dependent on their own pecu-
liar circumstances." 
In the case of K no>wles vs. Nor th Dakota Work-
men' s Comperu~ation Bureau (1925) 52 N.D. 563, 203 
N.VV. 89.5, plaintiff was employed as a mechanic and 
truck driver. He had borrowed a truck from his em-
ployer for his personal use on a Sunday. After using 
the truck, he took it back to his employer's garage, but 
it was locked, and a foreman told the plaintiff to take 
the truck home and bring it to the garage the following 
17 
morning. In attempting to crank the truck at his home 
the next morning, he was injured. The court held that 
the injury sustained was in the course of his employ-
ment. Said the Court: 
"YVhen he was cran~ing the truck on :Monday 
morning, preparatory to delivering it at the 
shops, he had ceased to be about his own busi-
ness, and was executing the orders of his master 
in the ordinary and actual course of his employ-
ment, and pursuant to the contract of service 
* * *. In the circumstances, regardless of where 
the truck happened to be, it was the duty of the 
plaintiff as a servant to bring it to the shops, 
not because he had borrowed it for his own use 
the day before, but because he was ordered to do 
so by his master in connection with the usual 
course of duty. He was on the business of his 
employer." 
All of these cases and authorities support the valid-
ity of Appellant's claim. They also support our view 
that the Commission has drawn conclusions of law ·which 
are neither supported by the actual facts of the record, 
nor the law of the State of Utah as set forth recently 
by this Court, nor by the text book authorities, nor by 
the authority of the cases generally. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to be compensated for his 
injuries because at the time of his accident, Appellant 
was an employee of Commercial Carriers, Inc., and 
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acting in the course of his employment. The employ-
ment agreement under which he worked as an employee 
and the uncontroverted facts as they appear in the 
transcript record of the hearing show that Appellant 
at the time of his accident had left his home and was 
on his way to the employer's Terminal to do his em-
ployer's work. He was engaged in an effort to start his 
employer's truck in the manner directed by his em-
ployer, and the truck and trailer as a unit was operated 
by Appellant exclusively and full time in his employer's 
business. 
The Commission in denying Appellant's claim has 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law 
as the law should be applied to the facts of this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PARK SlWOOT 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
847 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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